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ABSTRACT

An absent and uninterestedfather should not be able to withhold
consent to a child's adoptionto the detriment of the mother. However, when
the father is genuinely unawareof the child'sexistence, through deceit of the
mother or lack of communication, he is not being afforded the chance to be
interested As it now stands, North Carolinaadoption law is distressingly
inadequate because it does not provide any recoursefor biologicalfathers
in situationslike this. The law is too strict and statutory constructionforces
courts to apply the plain meaning of the statute ratherthan what is 'lust"
and consistent with the intendedpurpose of the Chapters. Fathers in these
situations should not automatically lose theirparentalrights. Although the
negative results are isolatedto a very narrowgroup of men, the effects are
so catastrophic that it is worth our attention. This Comment explores
solutions in the form of amendments to North Carolina General Statute
section 48-3-601 andNorth CarolinaGeneralStatute section 7B- 1111.
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INTRODUCTION

Venson Westgate and Brandi Wood had an on-and-off relationship for
three years that rekindled in late October to early November 2012.1 Wood
soon called off the relationship with Westgate to resume dating another man,
whom she married shortly after in January 2013.2 A month after her
marriage, Wood informed Westgate that she was twenty-weeks pregnant
demanded that he keep the pregnancy a secret for
with Westgate's child, but
3
the sake of her marriage.
Westgate immediately offered to set money aside for the child, but
4
Wood refused because she did not want her husband to know. Regardless,
5
Westgate started putting $100 to $140 per month in a lockbox for the baby.
In addition to offering financial support for the baby, he offered to purchase
specific items, he discussed healthcare providers, he suggested baby names,
and he even requested that he be present during the child's birth.6
In March, Westgate attended Wood's first sonogram appointment
where he further expressed his enthusiasm for becoming a father.7 Westgate
8
even offered to pay for Wood's medical bills, but Wood refused the offer.
Although Wood refused Westgate's financial support, Westgate was able to
9
provide Wood emotional support throughout the pregnancy, via Facebook.
1. In re Adoption of C.H.M. (C.H.M. 1), 788 S.E.2d 594, 595 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016),
rev'd, 812 S.E.2d 804 (2018).
2. Id.
3. In re Adoption of C.H.M. (C.H.M I/), 812 S.E.2d 804, 806 (N.C. 2018).
4. C.HM 1, 788 S.E.2d at 596.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 595.
7. C.H.M 1, 812 S.E.2d at 806.
8. Id.
9. C.H.M 1, 788 S.E.2d at 595; C.H.M 11, 812 S.E.2d at 806.
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Then in April 2013, Wood lied to Westgate and told him that the child
was not his and that the pregnancy was actually the result of a prior sexual
assault." Upon hearing this, Westgate requested a DNA test to confirm that
he was not the father.11 Wood refused his request. 12 Instead, Wood moved
to North Carolina and blocked Westgate on Facebook.' 3 Then on June 28,
14
2013, Wood gave birth to C.H.M. and placed the baby up for adoption.
Wood did not tell Westgate that she gave birth or that she placed the baby up
for adoption.' 5 Westgate also lied to the adoption agency when she told them
16
that her pregnancy was the result of a sexual assault.
17
Then in July 2013, Wood requested that Westgate meet her at a bar.
When it was obvious that Wood was no longer pregnant, Westgate inquired
about the baby.' Wood still neglected to tell Westgate that she put the baby
up for adoption, and instead she told him that the baby was being treated at
the hospital for a heart condition.' 9 Westgate once again requested a DNA
test so that he could be sure that the baby was not his.20 Wood refused his
request.2 1 Wood told Westgate that there was no chance that the baby was
his because the timeframe of conception and their intimate encounter did not
match up.22 She also told him that the baby's blood type and hair color did
not match his.23 Despite being repeatedly told that the baby was not his,
Westgate still contacted an attorney in September to see what his legal rights
were.24 In November, Wood finally admitted that Westgate was the father
and that she had put the baby up for adoption without his consent. 25
Westgate objected to the adoption and on April 23, 2014, there was a
hearing in Wake County District Court to determine whether Westgate's
consent to the adoption was necessary. 26 The district court ruled in favor of

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

C.HM 1, 788 S.E.2d at 595.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 595-96.
Id. at 596.
C.H.M. II, 812 S.E.2d 804, 806 (N.C. 2018).
C.H.M 1, 788 S.E.2d at 596.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Westgate and found that Westgate had in fact satisfied all three statutory
requirements imposed by North Carolina General Statute section 48-3-601,
27 The
and therefore Westgate's consent to the adoption was necessary.
29
North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed. 28 The supreme court reversed.
Despite Westgate's status as C.H.M.'s biological father and despite all
his efforts to provide financial and emotional support to Wood and the child
during the pregnancy, the supreme court applied section 48-3-601 and
3
concluded that Westgate's consent to the adoption was not necessary. " The
supreme court held that putting money into a lockbox is not the equivalent
31
of providing the type of "real, tangible support" that the statute requires.
That "[t]he unusual facts of this case cannot overshadow [Westgate' s] failure
to comply with the statutory requirements. 32
The North Carolina General Assembly enacted Chapter 48, the chapter
governing adoptions, with the stated purpose of balancing the rights of the
33
minor children, the biological parents, and the adoptive parents.
Section 48-3-601 of the North Carolina General Statutes, the section
regarding consent for adoption, is far too narrow and thus fails to support the
General Assembly's stated intent. The North Carolina General Assembly
also enacted Chapter 7B, Article 11, the article on the termination of parental
rights, with the stated purpose of terminating the rights of parents that
34 The
demonstrate they will not provide sufficient care for their child.
section regarding grounds for termination is also far too narrow and
inadequately furthers the stated intent. 35 The courts are restricted by the
statutory construction of these two statutes and have been forced to follow
the plain meaning, and unfortunately, capable fathers have been the ones
paying the cost.
An absent and uninterested father should not be able to withhold
consent to a child's adoption to the detriment of the mother. The North
Carolina Supreme Court in In re Byrd stated that the General Assembly
drafted section 48-3-601 with the noble intent "to protect the interest and
rights of men who have demonstrated paternal responsibility and to facilitate
the adoption process in situations where a putative father... has walked
away from his responsibilities to mother and child, but later wishes to
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 597.
Id. at 601.
CH.M.11, 812 S.E.2d 804, 812 (N.C. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 810-li.
Id. at 812.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-100(a) (2017).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1100(l) (2017).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B- 1111 (2017).
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intervene and hold up the adoption process."3 6 However, when the father is
genuinely unaware of the child's existence, through deceit of the mother or
lack of communication, he is not being afforded the chance to be interested.
Fathers in these situations should not automatically lose their parental rights.
Look at how child support works, for example. If a woman has a one-night
stand with a stranger and becomes pregnant, the father has no choice but to
pay child support for his child until the child reaches eighteen years of age. 37
This law makes sense; it takes two to tango, so both parties should be
responsible for the result. The same idea should underlie sections 48-3-601
and 7B-1 111.38 This Comment argues that if a father is legally obligated to
support his child, then the law should also protect the father's right to be a
father.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief background of North Carolina
law regarding adoptions and the termination of parental rights. Part II gives
several examples of recent North Carolina cases that have implemented these
statutes and were left with unjust rulings. Part III offers suggestions for ways
in which the North Carolina General Assembly can amend the statutes so
that they can better align with the intended purpose. Ultimately, this
Comment argues that the legislature should add catch-all phrases to sections
48-3-601 and 7B- 1111 of the North Carolina General Statutes that allow the
courts to decide these cases on an ad hoc basis by examining the facts of each
case and coming to the most fitting conclusion. Giving the court this kind of
discretion will prevent unjust rulings where the father does take substantial
steps for the child, but not the exact steps listed in the statute, and as a result
loses his parental rights. This Comment also argues that in situations where
the father is genuinely unaware of the child's existence, the court should
conduct a hearing to decide whether continuing with the adoption proceeding
or placing the child with the biological father is in the best interest of the
child.
I.
BACKGROUND OF THE NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL STATUTES:
CHAPTER 48 ADOPTIONS AND CHAPTER 7B ARTICLE 11 TERMINATION OF
PARENTAL RIGHTS

While enacting section 48-3-601 and section 7B-1111 of the North
Carolina General Statutes, the North Carolina legislature used language that
was entirely too strict. When applying these statutes, the courts have been

36. In re Byrd, 552 S.E.2d 142, 146 (N.C. 2001).
37. Shoafv. Shoat 192 S.E.2d 299, 303 (N.C. 1972).
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-3-601,7B-1111 (2017).
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forced to follow the plain meaning of the statutes and the results have been
inconsistent with the intended purpose of the chapters.
A.

Chapter 48 Adoptions: Intended Purpose of Chapter 48 Versus the
Strict Language of North CarolinaGeneral Statute Section 48-3-601

According to the legislative intent section of Chapter 48, the primary
39
purpose of the Chapter has, and always will be, the best interest of the child.
Over time, however, the General Assembly has changed its mind on what is
in a child's "best interest." Prior to 1996, the General Assembly believed
that maintaining stability was the best way to advance the child's best
interest.4 ° The legislature intended to protect the minor child from being
taken from his adoptive home after he had adjusted and been there for a
significant amount of time. 41 The secondary purpose of the statute at that
time was "to prevent later disturbance of [the adoptive parent's] relationship
to the child42 by biological parents whose legal rights have not been fully
protected.,
In 1996, the General Assembly amended the "legislative intent" section
of Chapter 48. 43 Although the best interest of the child remained the primary
4
goal, the General Assembly changed its mind on the path to get there. Prior
to the amendment, the statute stressed the importance of "protecting children
against disruption of their adoptive families., 45 The current statute, on the
other hand, concerns itself with the protection of the biological parent-child

39. See In re Adoption of Clark, 381 S.E.2d 835, 839 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd, 393
S.E.2d 791 (N.C. 1990). "The General Assembly finds that it is in the public interest to
establish a clear judicial process for adoptions ... that will provide for the needs and protect
the interests of all parties to an adoption, particularly adopted minors." N.C. GEN. STAT. §
48-1-100(a) (2017). "In construing this Chapter, the needs, interests, and rights of minor
adoptees are primary. Any conflict between the interests of a minor adoptee and those of an
adult shall be resolved in favor of the minor." Id. § 48-1-100(c)
40. See In re Clark, 381 S.E.2d at 839-40.
41. Id. "The primary purpose of this chapter is... to protect [the child] from
interference, long after they have become properly adjusted in their adoptive homes by
biological parents who may have some legal claim because of a defect in the adoption
Id. (citations omitted).
procedure ....
42. Id. at 840.
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-100 editor's note (1999). The General Assembly revised
Chapter 48 in 1995, but the revisions did not become effective until 1996.
44. Id. § 48-1-100(a).
45. See Lauren Vaughan, Note, Closing the Window of Opportunity: The Limited Rights
ofPutative Fathers Under N. C. Gen. Stat. § 48-3-601 and In re Byrd, 23 CAMPBELL L. REv.
305, 310 (2001).
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relationship by preventing unnecessary separation. 46 The secondary focus is
"to protect biological parents from ill-advised decisions to relinquish a child
or consent to the child's adoption., 47 The amendment also provides that the
provisions in the chapter "shall be liberally construed and applied to promote
its underlying purposes and policies."48
Following that logic, it would make sense that the courts should be
resolving these issues in favor of the relationship between the minor child
and his biological parent.49 Case law exemplifies that while a certain
outcome may be better aligned with the statute's purpose, courts are
prevented from reaching such an outcome because they are bound to follow
the plain meaning of the statute. ° In certain situations, the intent of the
statute and the statute itself stand at odds.5 1
In North Carolina, parental consent is necessary for the adoption of a
minor child.52 North Carolina General Statute 48-3-601 governs the rights
that unwed fathers have to prevent the adoption of their children.5 3 The plain
language of that statute states that a putative father's 5 4 consent to adoption is
only required if: (1) he is married to the mother;55 (2) if he has legitimized
46. § 48-1-100(b)(1). Currently "[t]he primary purpose of this Chapter is to advance the
welfare of minors by... protecting minors from unnecessary separation from their original
parents." Id.
47. Id. § 48-1-100(b)(2).
48. Id. § 48-1-100(d).
49. See id. §§ 48-1-100(a)-(d).
50. In re Byrd ex rel. Adoption of Byrd, 529 S.E.2d 465, 469 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), affd
sub nom. In re Byrd, 552 S.E.2d 142 (N.C. 2001). In Byrd, the court used statutory
construction to determine the statute's plain meaning because it was obligated to "yield to
[its] judicial stricture to follow the statutory law, not make it." Id. However, the plain
meaning of the statute led to an unjust result, and the court itself even acknowledged that "the
facts of a particular case may cry out for fairness, or a different result." Id. The statute makes
no exception for the support requirement of section 48-3-601, and the court refused to read in
any exception because the language of the statute was clear. Id. at 471. "As with the
acknowledgment requirement, the respondent was given the choice under the statute to
provide support for a biological mother who was uncertain as to whether he fathered the child,
or face the possibility that the child could be adopted by third parties without his consent."
Id.
51. Id. at 469-71.
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-603 (2017).
53. Id. § 48-3-601. Section 48-3-601 governs when the consent of the putative father is
necessary and section 48-3-603 provides when consent is not necessary. The putative father's
consent is not necessary if the parental rights of the putative father are already terminated
under North Carolina General Statute section 7B-111 l(a)(5) (2017).
54. A putative father is "[tihe alleged biological father of a child born out of wedlock."
Putativefather, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
55. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(1) (2017). Consent is required if the putative
father is married to the mother, if the child was born within 280 days after the termination of
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the minor under state law; 56 (3) if he acknowledged his paternity prior to the
filing of the petition; 57 (4) if he has received the minor into his home and
held out the minor as his child;58 (5) or if he is the adoptive father of the
minor child.59 Therefore, because the courts are required to follow the plain
meaning of the statute, if the father does not meet one of the above
requirements, the child can be put up for adoption without the father's
consent. A putative father could do "virtually all that could reasonably be
expected" of him under the circumstances and his child could still be put up
for adoption without his consent. 6° Taking a child away from a biological
61
father that does "virtually all that could reasonably be expected" under the
circumstances, does not62"[protect] minors from unnecessary separation from
their original parents."
B.

Chapter 7B Article 11 Termination of ParentalRights: Intended
Purpose of Article 11 Versus the Strict Language of North Carolina
GeneralStatute Section 7B-11

North Carolina General Statute section 48-6-603(a)(1) states that
consent is no longer necessary if the parental rights of the biological parents
have been terminated under Article 11 of Chapter 7B of North Carolina's
Juvenile Code.63 Article 11 of the Juvenile Code governs the termination of
parental rights. 64 According to the legislative intent section of Article 11,
the purpose of the Article is to have procedures in place to terminate parental
rights "when the parents have demonstrated that they will not provide the
65
degree of care which promotes the.., well-being of the juvenile." Also,
"to recognize the necessity... [of] a permanent plan of care at the earliest

the marriage, or if the parties separated pursuant to a separation agreement or order of
separation. Id. Consent is also required if the putative father attempted to marry the mother
prior to the birth, but the marriage was declared invalid. Id. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(2).
56. Id. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(3). In order to legitimize a child born out of wedlock, a putative
father may file a legitimization petition by attaching a certified birth certificate to the petition
and setting out the names of the mother and the child. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-10 (2017). "If
it appears to the court that the petitioner is the father of the child, the court may thereupon
declare and pronounce the child legitimated .. " Id.
57. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(4).
58. Id. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(5).
59. Id. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(6).
60. In re Byrd, 552 S.E.2d 142, 146 (N.C. 2001).
61. Id.
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-100(b)(1) (2017).
63. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-603 (2017).
64. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1100 (2017).
65. Id. § 7B-1100(1) (emphasis added).
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possible age, while at the same time recognizing the need to protect juveniles
from the unnecessary severance . . . with biological or legal parents., 66 Just
as the best interest of the child is the main concern of Chapter 48, Article 11
provides that "the best interests of the juvenile should be taken in all cases
where the interests of the juvenile and those of the juvenile's parents or other
67
persons are in conflict.

Following that logic, it would make sense that the courts should be
resolving these issues in favor of the relationship between the minor child
and his biological parent, unless the biological parent has shown that he will
not provide for the child. However, the case law demonstrates an opposite
result. 68 The courts are prevented from applying the intent of the statute

because the language of section 7B- 11 11 is also too strict.
Section 7B-1 1111 discusses the various grounds for terminating parental
rights. 69 According to section 7B-1 111, if an unwed father of the minor child
fails to take the necessary steps to legitimize his child prior to the filing of a
petition or motion to terminate parental rights, then his rights can be
terminated by the court.7" Therefore, in order to prevent the termination of
his rights, an unwed father must have: (1) acknowledged his paternity of the
minor child either judicially or by an affidavit; (2) legitimized the minor
child either by marriage to the mother or through filing a petition for
legitimation; or (3) "provided substantial financial support or consistent care
71
with respect to the juvenile and mother.,

66. Id. § 713-1100(2).
67. Id. § 7B-1100(3).
68. See A Child's Hope, LLC v. Doe, 630 S.E.2d 673, 679 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111 (2017).
70. Id. § 7B-111 1(a)(5). The court may also terminate parental rights: (1) if the parent
abused or neglected the child; (2) if the parent willfully abandoned the child in foster care for
over a year; (3) if the child is placed with the department of social services or another licensed
agency and the parent fails to pay a reasonable portion of the child support to the agency for
a period of six months preceding the petition while being physically and financially able to
do so; (4) if one parent has custody of the child pursuant to a court order and the noncustodial
parent willfully and without justification fails to pay child support for a period of one year
immediately preceding the filing of the petition; (5) if the parent is incapable of providing
proper care for the child and there is a reasonable probability that the incapability will
continue for the foreseeable future and the child is deemed dependent; (6) if the parent
willfully abandons the child for at least six consecutive months immediately preceding the
petition; (7) if the parent has committed murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child
of the parent or another child living in the home; (8) if the court has already terminated the
parent's right with respect to another child and the parent lacks the ability or willingness to
establish a safe home; or (9) if the father was convicted of rape and the child was conceived
as a result of that rape. Id. §§ 713-11l l(a)(l)-(l 1).
71. Id. § 7B-1lll(a)(5).
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Of course, these steps are not easy to take if the putative father is lied
to about the outcome of the pregnancy. For example, in situations where the
mother told the putative father that the child might not be his, that she had
miscarried, or that she had an abortion-it would be difficult for the putative
father to take any of the steps required by the statute. In the above situations,
the putative father often does not find out that he has a child until he is served
with a petition to terminate his parental rights and by then it is too late.72 Just
because a putative father failed to take the steps provided in section 7BI 11 1-because he is unaware of the child's existence--does not prove that
he "will not provide the degree of care which promotes the.., well-being of
the juvenile."73 All this shows is that he did not take the steps because he
was unaware, not that he would not have taken the necessary steps had he
been given the chance.
In sum, the North Carolina legislature has enacted two strict statutes
that are inconsistent with the stated intent of the Chapters. As a result, the
courts are forced to do the best they can while adhering to the plain meaning
of the statutes. Therefore, revising the statutes is the only way to receive
results that are in the best interest of the child and properly align with the
stated intent of the General Assembly.
H.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: "PLAIN MEANING" AND THE DETRIMENT
OF BIOLOGICAL FATHERS

Since North Carolina courts are forced to follow the plain meaning of
the law, judges are often left with no choice but to make a decision that
ignores the statute's goal of preserving biological relationships.74 As a
matter of statutory interpretation, if a statute is unambiguous on its face, then
courts are compelled to follow the plain meaning.7 5 However, if the statute
is ambiguous then the courts can look to outside evidence in order to
determine the legislative intent.7 6 As written, sections 48-3-601 and 7B1111 are unambiguous and courts are left to follow the law of statutory
construction and apply the plain meaning rule, even when the result is less
than desirable. 77 For example, the language of the statute has forced courts
to rule that a putative father's knowledge of his child's existence is irrelevant
72. See A Child'sHope, LLC, 630 S.E.2d at 679 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1 100(1) (2017) (emphasis added).
74. In re Byrd ex rel. Adoption of Byrd, 529 S.E.2d 465, 468 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), affd
sub nom. In re Byrd, 552 S.E.2d 142 (N.C. 2001) (holding that the court must apply the plain
meaning of the statute, even if it results in the outcome is an unjust result).
75. Id. at 469.
76. See id.
77. Id.
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as to whether or not he loses his parental rights.78 The following cases
demonstrate how strict compliance with these narrow rules have led to unjust
results.
In September 1997, eighteen-year old Shelly O'Donnell told her
seventeen-year old boyfriend, Michael Gilmartin, that she was pregnant with
his child.7 9 Michael immediately offered her the opportunity to live at his
mother's house during her pregnancy to cut down on expenses.8" She
refused the offer.8 1 Michael then began working two full-time jobs in order
to save money for the baby.8 2
Later in her pregnancy, Shelly informed Michael that he may not be the
father because a new ultrasound indicated a different due date, and therefore,
a different timeframe for the conception.8 3 Shelly decided that she wanted
to give the child up for adoption.84 Since Shelly was unsure of who the
child's biological father was, she asked Michael to consent to the adoption.8 5
Michael refused her request and told her that he would take care of the child
himself.8 6
On March 4, 1998, Shelly gave birth to Rachel.87 Michael found out
about the baby through his mother and attempted to see Rachel, but was not
allowed because he was not an approved visitor.8 8 Despite not being allowed
to visit, he attempted to be there for the baby by purchasing a $100.00 money
order and baby clothes that he gave to his mother to pass on to Rachel.89
78. See In re Adoption of Clark, 381 S.E.2d 835, 839 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd, 393
S.E.2d 791 (N.C. 1990) (holding that "a putative father's knowledge of the existence of his
illegitimate child is not relevant to a proper analysis of the necessity of a putative father's
consent under Section [48-3-603(a)(1)]."). The mother does have to provide the father notice
of the adoption petition, but if the father does not do one of the five things listed in §7B111 1(a)(5) prior to the petition, he loses his parental rights, making it immaterial as to whether
he objects to his child being adopted. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1 11 l(a)(5).
79. In re Byrd ex rel. Adoption ofByrd, 529 S.E.2d at 467.
80. Id. at 469.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 469-70.
83. Id. at 467.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. On November 14, 1997, Shelly called Michael and informed him that the child
may not be his. Id. at 472 (Hunter, J., dissenting). Regardless of this knowledge, Michael
"refused to consent to the adoption and advised [Shelly] that he still wanted to raise the child."
Id. at 473.
87. Id. at 467 (majority opinion).
88. Id. at 473 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 470 (majority opinion). Michael's mother was not on the hospital's allowed
visitors list either. She mailed the clothes and money to Shelly. Id. at 473 (Hunter, J.,
dissenting).
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The next day, March 5, 1998, the Byrds filed an adoption petition in
Wake County District Court to adopt Rachel. 9° That same day, Michael filed
a complaint and petition in Chowan County District Court requesting "(1)
the court to order a blood test to determine parentage of the baby, (2) all other
proceedings in the cause be stayed until the test results were available and
(3) custody should be granted in his favor ... if he was determined to be the
92
father."'" The district court denied Michael's petition. Michael later filed
93
a petition for a blood test in Wake County, which was granted by the court.
94
The blood test confirmed that he was indeed Rachel's father.
Despite Michael's status as Rachel's biological father and despite all
his efforts to gain custody of her, the Wake County District Court applied
section 48-3-601 and concluded that Michael's consent to the adoption was
not necessary. 95 The court based its decision on the fact that Michael
"neither adequately acknowledged paternity nor provided the financial
96 The
support required under General Statute section 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II).
court of appeals affirmed the lower court ruling. 97 The court of appeals did
admit that Michael faced a "difficult dilemma:" he either had to acknowledge
paternity of a child that might not be his, or face the possibility that his child
might be adopted without his consent.98 The court recognized that this case
"may cry out for fairness, or a different result," but the court was required to
apply the rules of statutory construction and apply the "plain meaning" of
the law.9 9 The supreme court also affirmed the ruling and noted that
"[Michael] did virtually all that could reasonably be expected of any man,
and certainly of a seventeen-year-old, under the circumstances," but there

90. Id. at 467 (majority opinion).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 466-67.
A putative father must have acknowledged his paternity and provided, in
accordance with his financial means, reasonable and consistent payments for the
support of the biological mother during or after the term of pregnancy, or the
support of the minor, or both, which may include the payment of medical expenses,
living expenses, or other tangible means of support, and has regularly visited or
communicated, or attempted to visit or communicate with the biological mother
during or after the term of pregnancy, or with the minor, or with both.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(I) (2017).
97. In re Byrd ex rel. Adoption of Byrd, 529 S.E.2d at 468-69.
98. Id. at 468-69.
99. Id. at 469.
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was nothing the court could do because "the statute is clear in its
requirements." 00
In A Child's Hope, LLC v. Doe,10 1 Peter, 102 a college student at UNC
Chapel Hill, was in a romantic relationship with Monica, 0 3 a woman that he
had known for years.10 4 In August 2001, Monica told Peter that she was
pregnant.'0 5 Upon hearing the news that he was a father, Peter immediately
dropped out of college, moved back home with his mother in Sampson
County in order to save money, and began working so that he could provide
for the baby. 106 Peter attended a prenatal appointment, cared for Monica's
two children during other prenatal appointments, and purchased a larger four
door vehicle to transport the child. 107 The couple even discussed baby names
and the possibility of marriage in the future.' 018 However, when Peter
informed Monica that he was not quite ready for marriage, their relationship
declined and they eventually broke up. 10'
After the break up, Monica requested that Peter relinquish his rights to
the baby. ' 10 Peter refused and told Monica that if she was not willing to care
for the baby once it was born, he was willing to be the primary caretaker.1 1
Subsequently, Monica told him that she had a miscarriage and that there was
"no child.""' Peter was skeptical after their previous conversations, so he
took steps to verify whether or not Monica was telling the truth about the
miscarriage."' He went to Monica's doctor in order to inquire whether she
in fact had a miscarriage, but his investigation at the hospital did not go far. 114
Due to confidentiality laws, the doctors could not provide him with any
information regarding Monica's medical history. "5 After failing at the
100. In re Byrd, 552 S.E.2d 142, 146 (N.C. 2001).
101. A Child's Hope, LLC v. Doe, 630 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
102. For ease of reading, a pseudonym is used in place of "the biological father."
103. Again, a pseudonym is used for ease of reading.
104. A Child's Hope, LLC, 630 S.E.2d at 674.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. !d. at 674-75.
108. Id. at 674.
109. Id. at 675.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id Peter saw in an online newspaper article that an unidentified baby was left at the
Johnson Memorial Hospital during the same weekend that Monica claimed to have a
miscarriage, so Peter contacted the hospital to see if Monica had in fact given birth. Id. The
hospital staff could not provide him with any medical information regarding Monica due to
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doctor's office, Peter went to the Johnston County Department of Social
Services to get help in finding his child. 1 6 The agency initiated an
17
investigation and determined that he was indeed the father of the child."
8
Peter subsequently filed an action for custody."
The Wake County District Court ruled in Peter's favor and denied the
9
petition to terminate his parental rights. ' The court of appeals reversed the
district court's ruling and held that Peter had no legal right to the minor
child. 120 Therefore, despite Monica lying about the status of the pregnancy,
the drastic life changes that Peter made after learning of the pregnancy, and
to the child. 121
his continued efforts to find the baby, he still had no legal right
The court terminated Peter's rights because he failed to take the specific
122 The court
action required by General Statute section 7B-1111(a)(5).
staunchly applied the plain meaning of the statute and held that because Peter
failed to establish paternity judicially, legitimatize the child through the
judicial process or through marriage, or provide the biological mother with
care throughout the pregnancy, he had no
substantial support or consistent
123
rights.
parental
his
claim for
confidentiality concerns. Id. After no luck at the hospital, Peter went to the Johnston County
Department of Social Services to further inquire about the child mentioned in the article. Id.
The Johnston County Department of Social Services allowed Peter to take a paternity test, but
the test results were negative with regard to the newspaper article baby. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 676.
118. Id. Based on Peter's report to the Department of Social Services, one of the DSS
social workers contacted Monica and questioned her about the father. Id. Monica claimed
that the baby was conceived during a rape in Chapel Hill and that she did not know the father's
identity. Id. The court found "that during the entirety of the pregnancy [Monica] concealed
her pregnancy from her entire family due to embarrassment that would be caused from having
a third child by a third different father." Id.
119. Id. at673.
120. Id. at 678-79.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. Judge Jackson disagreed with the majority's holding and distinguished in her
dissent the instant case from Byrd and Anderson,
The majority relies on the holdings of In re Adoption of Byrd, 354 N.C. 188, 552
S.E.2d 142 (2001) and In re Adoption of Anderson, 360 N.C. 271, 624 S.E.2d 626
(2006) in its opinion. Although I recognize that this line of cases has established
bright line rules regarding the rights of a putative father, I believe that the instant
case is distinguishable from both Byrd and Anderson due to its unique facts. In both
Byrd andAnderson, the putative fathers made offers of support, which subsequently
were turned down by the biological mothers. In the instant case, it is undisputed
that [Peter] made drastic changes in his life upon learning of the pregnancy.
[Peter]'s actions from the time he learned of the pregnancy cannot be seen as
anything but an acknowledgment of his paternity.
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The court failed to give weight to the fact that it was only when Monica
told Peter that she had miscarried that he stopped preparing for the child.
Even after receiving the news, Peter made every effort to verify whether
Monica's statements were true. Technically, because Peter did not take the
precise steps needed under statute, the court was obligated to terminate his
parental rights. The legislature did not intend for unjust results such as this,
but because of the way the statute is written, the court had no choice but to
come to this conclusion. Peter made sufficient attempts to be an engaged
father, but because of the way the law is written, his attempts fell short.
Essentially, Peter was "damned if he tried and damned if he didn't."
Eight years later, the North Carolina Supreme Court heard a similar
case in In re Adoption of S.D. W.124 In this case, Gregory Johns was involved
in a relationship with Laura Welker for less than a year. 125 They were never
married and they never cohabitated. 126 Their relationship was "mostly
physical."' 27 In 2009, while Welker was using an Intra-Uterine Device for
birth control, Welker became pregnant and the couple mutually decided that
Welker would have an abortion.128 After terminating the pregnancy, Welker
told Johns that she had changed her birth control method to a hormonal shot,
and the couple continued to engage in sexual intercourse without a
condom. 2 9 By March 2010, Johns had ended the relationship with Welker
and all contact between the two had ceased. 30 Seven months later, Welker
gave birth to Johns' baby, S.D.W.'
Johns did not find out that Welker gave birth until he heard it from a
friend in April 201 1.132 Welker had written a false name under the father
line on the Affidavit of Parentage and left the line for the last known address
blank.' 33 At the same time, Welker relinquished custody of S.D.W. to an
Id. at 679. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
124. In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 2014).

125. Id. at 375.
126. Id.
127. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Id. at 376.
129. Id.
130. Id. Welker cut off contact with Johns after March 2010, aside from one night of
sexual intercourse on Johns' birthday in November 2010. Id.
131. Id.
132. In re S.D.W., 745 S.E.2d 38, 41 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013), rev'd sub nom. 758 S.E.2d

374 (N.C. 2014).
133. In re Adoption of S.D. W., 758 S.E.2d at 376. When a parent attempts to place her
child for adoption, it is necessary for the parent to file an Affidavit of Parentage "[t]o assist
the court in determining that a direct placement was valid and all necessary consents have
been obtained, the parent or guardian who placed the minor shall execute an affidavit setting
out names, last known addresses, and marital status of the minor's parents or possible
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adoption agency and the minor child was placed in the custody of the
prospective adoptive parents. 13 4 As soon as Johns found out that he had a
child, he took steps to assert his parental rights and prevent the adoption from
taking place. 3 ' The North Carolina Supreme Court, however, refused to
hold that Johns' parental rights were violated.136 The court determined "that
obtaining notice of the pregnancy and birth was not beyond Johns'[ ] control
and that he had sufficient opportunity to acknowledge paternity and establish
'
Although
himself as a responsible parent within the time set by statute." 137
Welker told Johns that she was using a hormonal birth control shot, the
court's majority said that he should have been on notice because he was not
using condoms in addition to the shot.138 Justice Jackson criticized the
majority for holding that men must "use multiple, redundant forms of
and care for
contraception or risk losing any rights they might have to raise
139
any children that result from this (protected) sexual activity."'
The majority stated Johns should have been on notice of Welker's
fertility due to the fact that he had previously impregnated her. 140 The court
believed that Johns' knowledge of Welker's fertility should have led him to
inquire as to whether or not she was pregnant after the relationship had
ended. 141
The dissent, on the other hand, posited that the fact of Welker's
previous pregnancy cut in the other direction. 142 The first time Welker
became pregnant by Johns, she immediately told him. 4 3 Therefore, he
would have no reason to believe she would not tell him again. 144 It is hard
to imagine how "Johns had any meaningful opportunity to acquire notice of
the fact that Welker was pregnant or had borne a child" when "Welker told
Johns she was using birth control, when she told him about a prior
parents." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-206(a) (2017). On the Affidavit of Parentage, Welker
"incorrectly nam[ed] 'Gregory Thomas James' as the father and [left] blank the line for the
father's last known address." In re Adoption ofS.D. W., 758 S.E.2d at 376.
134. In re Adoption of S.D.W, 758 S.E.2d at 376. Welker relinquished custody to
Christian Adoption Services, Inc. and once again Welker "misidentified the father as 'Gregory
Thomas James." on the agency intake form. Id. The agency previously identified Benjamin
and Heather Jones as the prospective adoptive parents. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 375.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 382 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 380 (majority opinion).
141. Id.
dissenting).
142. Id. at 382 (Jackson, J.,
143. Id.
144. Id.
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pregnancy, when she knew of this pregnancy but said nothing, and when she
acted affirmatively to conceal S.D.W.'s existence from him."' 4 5
Without having studied the law, it would not be obvious to these men
that they needed to do more in order to secure their parental rights. Being
that the courts are obligated to follow stare decisis and apply the foundational
rules of statutory construction, the courts are powerless to prevent these
unjust results. The courts do not have authority to overstep their role as the
judicial branch and essentially make new law by ruling contrary to the plain
meaning. 146 Therefore, it is up to the legislature to amend the language of
the statute in order to better align the wording of the statutes with their
intended purpose.

III. FRAMEWORK FOR A POTENTIAL AMENDMENT
In order to amend the statutes correctly and to prevent injustice, the
legislature should look to the stated intent of Chapter 48 and Article 11. As
previously stated, the best interest of the child has always been the primary
focus of the legislature while constructing Chapter 48 and Article 11. Any
interest that conflicts with the best interest of the child should be resolved
accordingly. 14' Almost forty percent of the children born each year are to
unmarried women. "'8The family dynamic is rapidly changing and the law
needs to progress with it.' 49 Regardless of whether the minor child is born
into a nuclear family or out of a one-night-stand, a father's rights should be
protected. 5 ° A father's rights should be equal to the mother's, and only
second to the rights of the minor child.
The courts are at the mercy of the law as it is written. Therefore, in
order to come to a just result, it is up to the General Assembly to make the
changes necessary to protect the father's rights. The statutes as currently
145. Id.at 383.
146. In re Byrd ex rel. Adoption of Byrd, 529 S.E.2d 465, 468 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), ajfd
sub nom. In re Byrd, 552 S.E.2d 142 (N.C. 2001).
147. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1100(3) (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-100(c) (2017).
148.

Unmarried

Childbearing,

CDC/NAT'L

CTR.

FOR

HEALTH

STATISTICS,

https://perma.cc/F9A7-93G8 (last updated Mar. 31, 2017).
149. See Jennifer R. Johnson, Preferredby Law: The Disappearanceof the Traditional
Family and Law's Refusal to Let it Go, 25 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 125, 128-29 (2004).
"Families differ in both size and shape within and among the many cultural and socioeconomic layers that make up this society. We cannot continue to pretend that there is one
formula... to achieve the supportive, loving environment we believe children should
inhabit." Id.at 131 (internal citation omitted).
150. See Erin E. Gibbs, Preserving Your Right to Parent: The Supreme Court of North
CarolinaAddresses UnmarriedFathers'DueProcessRights in In re Adoption of S.D.W., 94
N.C. L. REv. 723, 723 (2016).
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written generally accomplish the purpose of protecting mothers from an
uninterested father refusing to consent to the adoption. However, the statutes
do nothing to protect the rights of uninformed or misinformed fathers.
Although the negative results are isolated to a narrow group of men, the
effect is so catastrophic that it is worth amending the statute to correct it.
This Part will offer the North Carolina General Assembly the necessary
framework for potential amendments to General Statutes section 48-3-601
and section 7B- 1111 in order to soften the language of the current statutes.
It will also propose amendments to sections 48-3-601 and 7B-1 111 in order
to provide for an exception for fathers who are genuinely unaware of their
child's existence. If a court finds that a father was unaware of his child's
existence, then there should be a hearing to determine what placement is in
the best interest of the child.
A.

ProposedAmendments to GeneralStatute Section 48-3-601 and
Section 7B-1111: To ProtectFathers Who Take SubstantialSteps
under the Circumstances

In order to give the courts more discretion when interpreting the
statutes, a catch-all clause should be added to both section 48-3-601 and
section 7B-1 111. For example, the current section 48-3-601 says that the
putative father's consent for adoption is only necessary if: (1) he is married
152
to the mother;"' (2) he has legitimized the minor under state law; (3) he
15 3 (4) he has
acknowledged his paternity prior to the filing of the petition;
54
received the minor into his home and held out the minor as his child; or
(5) if he is the adoptive father of the minor child.' 55 If the legislature added
a catch-all clause stating, "or any other substantial attempt, under the
circumstances, to provide for the minor child," then the statute would no
longer be as strict and it would be in the court's discretion to determine what
constitutes a "substantial attempt."
The current section 7B- 1111 states that the termination of parental
rights is proper if the putative father failed to (1) acknowledge his paternity
of the minor child either judicially or by an affidavit; (2) legitimize the minor
child either by marriage to the mother or through filing a petition for
legitimation; or (3) provide substantial financial support or consistent care
with respect to the minor child and mother. 15 6 Just as with section 48-3-601,
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(1) (2017).
Id. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(3).
Id. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(4).
Id. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(5).
Id. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(6).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(a)(5) (2017).
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the legislature should add a catch-all clause stating, "or any other substantial
attempt, under the circumstances, to provide for the minor child." If the
legislature adds such catch-all clauses to these statutes, the courts would no
longer be plagued by the plain-meaning doctrine and courts would be able to
reach a just result for these men and their children.
In order to determine what qualifies as a "substantial attempt," the
courts would consider the specific circumstances of each case. The test
would be "if the putative father did all that could be reasonably expected
under the circumstances," then his consent would be required for the
adoption of the child. An example of a "substantial attempt" would be if
there is evidence that the putative father continually offered to provide
financial support to the mother during the pregnancy, but she continually
denied the help. Or, if the putative father provided emotional and financial
help in the beginning of the pregnancy up until he was told that the mother
had a miscarriage or an abortion.
Let us use Michael Gilmartin' 57 as an example to illustrate how the
amendment to section 48-3-601 would work. Michael "(1) offer[ed] to
provide [Shelly] with a place to live during her pregnancy, (2) obtain[ed]
various jobs to provide support for the child, and (3) fil[ed] several court
documents requesting custody of the child upon a determination that he was
the child's biological father." 15 8 Under these facts and applying section 483-601 as it is currently written, the court could not take into account the fact
that Michael made these attempts.159 All that mattered under section 48-3601 was that Michael did not acknowledge the paternity of the child,
regardless of whether the child was actually his. 6 ' Even though Shelley
made it clear that she would not accept any financial support from him, the
statute punished Michael for failing to provide financial support.16 '
Therefore, the court was forced to rule that Michael's consent was not
necessary for the adoption of his child.162 With the softer language of the
proposed amendment, the court would be able to take into account all the
attempts that Michael made as well as the fact that Michael had no
knowledge as to whether the child was actually his.
We will use Peter in order to illustrate the effects of the section 7B11 11 proposed amendment. Peter also "continued to prepare to parent the
minor child by maintaining consistent contact.., with [Monica] regarding
157. In re Byrd ex rel. Adoption of Byrd, 529 S.E.2d 465 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000), aff'd sub
nom. In re Byrd, 552 S.E.2d 142 (N.C. 2001).
158. Id. at 468.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 470-71.
162. Id.at 469.
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the progress of the pregnancy, leaving school to return home to care for the
child, gaining and maintaining employment, attending a prenatal
163 Even
appointment ... and purchasing a larger car to transport the child."
after being told that Monica miscarried, Peter "took fairly dramatic steps to
ensure the veracity of [Monica's] statements" and searched for evidence of
his child. 164 After finding out that his child was not miscarried, Peter
immediately filed an action to legitimate the child.' 65 In applying section
7B-1111 as written, the court was unable to look at all the relevant
circumstances, therefore, the court held that "[d]espite the fact that [Peter]
may have acted consistently with acknowledging his paternity, the statute is
clear in its requirements ... and there was no evidence that [Peter] met those
requirements."' 66 The court was also unable to consider the fact that Monica
"purposefully deceived" Peter. 167 Under the proposed amendment, the court
would be able to look at the whole picture and determine whether Peter did
all that could be reasonably expected of him under the circumstances.
These amendments would protect fathers, like Michael and Peter, that
arguably took significant steps to provide for their children yet failed to take
the specific steps listed in sections 48-3-601 and 7B-1 I 11. Courts would no
longer have to "yield to ... judicial stricture"' 68 and could consider all the
relevant circumstances. Further, because the statutes would no longer be
strict and unambiguous, the court could look beyond the plain-meaning of
the words and apply the General Assembly's stated purpose-protection of
the biological parent-child relationship by preventing unnecessary
separation. 169 With the addition of the catch-all clauses, courts would likely
find that Michael and Peter did all that could reasonably be expected of them
under the circumstances. Applying the softer language of the amended
statutes, Michael and Peter's consent would have been necessary prior to the
adoption of their children.
Adding the catch-all clauses to sections 48-3-601 and 7B- 111 would
help men like Michael and Peter who knew about their children and "did
virtually all that could reasonably be expected" of them. 170 However, men
7
that were lied to, or not told about the existence of a child, like Johns,' ' have

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

A Child's Hope, LLC v. Doe, 630 S.E.2d 673, 674-75 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 680 (Jackson, J. dissenting).
Id. at 676 (majority opinion).
Id. at 678.
Id. at 679 (Jackson, J. dissenting).
In re Byrd ex rel. Adoption of Byrd, 529 S.E.2d at 469.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 713-1 100(2) (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-100(b)(1) (2017).
In re Byrd, 552 S.E.2d 142, 146 (N.C. 2001).
In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 2014).
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no incentive to make an effort, let alone a "substantial attempt," to provide
for a child that they do not even know exists.
B.

ProposedAmendments to North CarolinaGeneralStatute Sections 483-601 and 7B-111(a)(5): What to Do When the Putative Fatheris
Unaware of the Mother's Pregnancy

For situations where the father claims that he was not informed of the
child's existence, there needs to be more than just a catch-all phrase in the
statutes. If a putative father truly did not know about the pregnancy, his
parental rights should not be terminated because he failed to acknowledge
paternity and provide substantial financial support under sections 48-3-601
or 7B- 111 (a)(5). It is impossible to acknowledge paternity and provide
support for an unknown child.
First, the legislature needs to amend both North Carolina General
Statute section 48-3-601 and section 7B-111 l(a)(5) to include exceptions
regarding putative fathers with no knowledge of the child. 172 Then,
practically speaking, if a putative father receives notice that his parental
rights are being terminated pursuant to section 7B- 1111 or that his child is
being placed for adoption pursuant to section 48-3-601, he would need to
immediately file a petition and an affidavit swearing under penalty of perjury
that he falls within the exception and had no knowledge of the child's
existence. 173 Finally, after receiving the petition and affidavit, the court
would need to have a hearing to determine whether placing the child with
the putative father would further the best interest of the child.' 74
1. An Exceptionfor Fathers With No Knowledge of the Child
If a putative father truly did not know about the pregnancy, his parental
rights should not be terminated because he failed to acknowledge paternity
and provide substantial financial support under either section 7B- 1111 or
section 48-3-601.
The current section 7B-11 11 states that termination of parental rights is
proper if "[t]he father of a juvenile born out of wedlock" failed to (1)
acknowledge his paternity of the minor child either judicially or by an
affidavit; (2) legitimize the minor child either by marriage to the mother or
through filing a petition for legitimation; or (3) provide substantial financial
support or consistent care with respect to the minor child and mother. 175 The

172.
173.
174.
175.

See infra Section III.B.I.
See infra Section III.B.2.
See infra Section III.B.3.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1111(a)(5) (2017).
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legislature should amend the language in section 7B-1 11 l(a)(5) from "[t]he
father of a juvenile born out of wedlock" to "[t]he father of a juvenile born
176
The
out of wedlock, with the knowledge of the juvenile's existence.',
provide
would
existence"
addition of "with the knowledge of the juvenile's
for an exception within the statute in order to prevent unjust rulings.
The current section 48-3-601 states that a putative father's consent to
adoption is only required if he has done one of the following things before
the filing of the adoption petition: (1) he is married to the mother; 17 7 (2) if he
has legitimized the minor under state law; 178 (3) if he acknowledged his
paternity prior to the filing of the petition;179 (4) if he has received the minor
into his home and held out the minor as his child;18 ° (5) or if he is the adoptive
father of the minor child. 81 The legislature should amend the language of
section 48-3-601 to include a clause that states "if the biological father was
unaware of the child's existence until after the date of the adoption petition,
then the biological father may petition the court and request that his consent
be required prior to the adoption."
2.

Petition and Affidavit

Courts must determine whether or not the putative father actually knew
about the child. 1 82 Since determining that the father had no knowledge of
the child does not immediately give the father custody but only gives him
the opportunity to have a hearing, the burden of proof should be relatively
low to avoid unjust results. For example, in the past, courts have looked at
whether or not the father should have known of the child's existence or
whether he took the proper steps to find out.' 83 The courts have held that
having sexual intercourse with a known-fertile woman was enough to put a

176. Id.
177. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(1) (2017). Consent is also required if the putative
father attempted to marry the mother prior to the birth but the marriage was declared invalid.
Id. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(2).
178. Id. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(3).
179. Id. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(4).
180. Id. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(5).
181. Id. § 48-3-601(2)(b)(6).
182. In a practical sense, this would apply to men that have been lied to by the biological
mother so they would not have knowledge of a child's existence. It would also apply to
situations where a woman gets pregnant after a one-night stand and has no way of getting in
contact with the father. There could be other situations where this would apply; however,
these are the situations that have been issues in the past. See In re Adoption of S.D.W., 758
S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 2014).
183. Id. at 376 (ruling against the putative father because the court believed that he should
have known about the minor child's existence because it was within his "control").
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putative father on notice that the mother was pregnant.1 84 That even though
the mother said she was on birth control, the father should have also worn a
condom.185
Courts should only require that the putative father file a petition and an
affidavit swearing under penalty of perjury that he had no knowledge of the
child. Making the putative father swear under penalty of perjury provides
some protection against fathers who knew about the child and did nothing,
yet it provides fathers that truly had no knowledge of the child a chance to
prove to the judge that he is in the best interest of the child. For example,
being lied to about the presence of birth control or about the existence of the
child would be enough to get a putative father past this initial hurdle.
a. Hearingto Determine the Best Interest of the Child
Once the court gets over this initial hurdle of the petition and affidavit,
it is necessary to have a hearing to determine what is in the best interest of
the minor child. The hearing will determine whether continuing with the
adoption proceeding and terminating the father's parental rights is in the best
interest of the minor child or whether discontinuing the adoption proceeding
and placing the child with the biological father is in the best interest of the
minor child. Because the right to parent is a fundamental right of a biological
parent, and this hearing could potentially lead to the termination of a father's
parental rights, the standard of proof should be whether there is clear and
186
convincing evidence that the putative father is unfit to parent.
With that said, the best interest of the child should always be
paramount. Therefore, the child's stability should not be overlooked. For
example, if the child has already been with the adoptive family for a year or
more, then the stability of the child should outweigh the rights of the father
and the child should remain with the adoptive family.' 8 7 However, if a
putative father petitions the court shortly after the child is born, like these
men did, then the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the
putative father is unfit to parent in order to terminate his parental rights.
While making this determination, the court must keep in mind that according
to the legislature the best interest of the child is best accomplished by
184. Id. at379-80.
185. Id.
186. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires that the State support its allegations by clear and convincing
evidence before it can sever the rights of parents in their biological child. Id.
187. "In the case ofajuvenile who is in the custody or placement responsibility of a county
department of social services and has been in placement outside the home for 12 of the most
recent 22 months.., the director of the department of social services shall initiate a
proceeding to terminate the parental rights .. " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-906.1 (f) (2017).
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preventing unnecessary separation of the child and the biological parent
whenever possible.188
CONCLUSION

An absent and uninterested father should not be awarded the benefit of
withholding consent to a child's adoption. However, when a father does take
substantial steps for the benefit of the child, but not the exact steps
enumerated in section 48-3-601, he should not automatically lose his
parental rights. Also, if a father is genuinely unaware of the existence of the
minor child, through deceit or lack of communication, he should not lose his
parental rights without a hearing to plead his case.
North Carolina adoption law, as it now stands, is distressingly
inadequate because it does not provide any recourse for biological fathers in
these situations. Currently, the plain meaning of the consent statute is at
odds with the legislative intent of the Chapter and it is in desperate need of
an amendment. The North Carolina General Assembly could remedy these
errors by (1) adding catch-all clauses within the statute which would allow
for the court's discretion and (2) by having hearings in which the court would
determine whether continuing with the adoption proceeding or placing the
child with the biological father is in the best interest of the minor child. In
both of these situations, the court should make sure it keeps in mind the
purpose of the chapter, which is "to advance the welfare of minors by []
protecting minors from unnecessary separation from their original
parents."" 9
Baylee J Hapeman*

188. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1100(2) (2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-100(b)(1) (2017).
189. § 48-1-100(b)(1).
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